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Introduction 
The ascription of content based states-beliefs, desires, 
preferences, and so on-to nonhuman animals is still a 
subject of much debate in philosophy. Contemporary 
authors such as Donald Davidson, I R.G. Frey,2 Norman 
Malcolm,3 and Stephen Stich4 have all argued that the 
ascription of beliefs, desires, and other content based 
mental states to nonhuman animals is in some way 
misconceived. One important sub-class of these 
arguments, largely associated with Stich but also present 
in the work of the others, is based on the claim tlmt it is 
impossible to specify the content of such states as 
applied to nonhuman animals. The primary aim of this 
paper is to provide a sound theoretical underpinning to 
the practice of ascribing content, and, hence, content 
based states, to nonhuman animals. It will be argued 
that this practice is grounded in neither crude 
anthropomorphism, nor in sentimentalism, hut in solid, 
down to earth, evolutionary biology. 
Such a claim, of course, will, if correct, have 
significant consequences vis-a-vis the application of 
ethical theory to nonhuman animals. Most attempts to 
bring nonhumcUls into the moral sphere presuppose, at 
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least implicitly, that they are possessors of contentful 
states. Many of the more plausible attempts are quite 
explicit about this. Thus, Peter Singer's argument for 
animal liberation derives from his preference-
utilitarianism, and its application to nonhumans 
presupposes that they can be the bearers of preferences. 
Since preferences are individuated by their content, this, 
in tum, presupposes that it is legitimate to ascribe content 
to nonhurnans. Tom Regan's defense of animal rights 
depends on the claim that nonhumans can be subjects-
of-a-life, where an individual is a suhject-of-a-life only 
if it has beliefs, desires, perceptions, memories, etc. and 
a sense of the futufC, including their own future. All these 
are contentful states. Therefore, a sound defense of the 
practice of ascribing content to nonhuman animals can 
quite plausibly be regarded as a cornerstone of the attempt 
to bring them under the moral umbrella. 
The opening sections discuss Stich's argument 
against the possibility of the ascription of content to 
nonhuman animals. It will be argued that the problems 
Stich discerns with such ascription stem not from the 
nature of such animals, but from the theory of meaning 
presupposed by Stich. This can be seen from the fact 
that, given the theory of meaning adopted by Stich, 
exactly the same problems can also be discerned in the 
ascription of content to human animals, even to those 
human animals who constitute normal members of our 
own cultural group. Attention will then be focused on a 
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more adequate theory of meaning. The pivotal concept 
employed by this theory is that of reference, or 
representation, and the concept of reference will be 
explained in terms of the concept of biological function. 
The resulting theory, it will be argued, provides a sound 
theoretical framework for the ascription of content to 
both human and nonhuman animals. 
Stich on Ascription of Content to 
Nonhuman Animals 
Stephen Stich has argued that specifying the content of 
the beliefs of nonhuman animals is impossible. In "Do 
Animals Have Beliefs?," he argues that this entails that 
the whole issue is lIWot. The question has no answer. In 
his later book, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive 
Science, he takes a slightly more conciliatory stance 
when he claims that the question is hopelessly context-
relative.s In some conversational contexts, ascription 
of content based states to a nonhuman animal would be 
correct, but in another context, ascription of the same 
content based state to the same animal at the same time 
would be incorrect. I shall begin this paper with a 
discussion of Stich's argument because I think he does 
provide the most careful and most clearly thought out 
case against the possibility of ascribing content based 
states to nonhuman animals. The arguments I shall 
eventually marshal against Stich can also be applied to 
the arguments of the other aforementioned authors. 
In broad outline, Stich's argument can be represented 
as follows: 
1. We can attribute content to a belief only if we 
assume that the subject of the belief has a broad 
network of related beliefs that is largely similar 
to our own. 
2. Where a subject does not share a very substantial 
part of our own network of beliefs we are no 
longer capable of attributing content to that 
subject's beliefs. 
3. Nonhuman animals do not shart: a substantial part 
of our own network of beliefs. 
4. Therefore, we are incapable of attributing content 
to the beliefs of nonhuman animals. 
5. But content is an essential element of belief. We 
can attribute beliefs to a subject only insofar as 
we can specify tile content of those beliefs. 
6. Therefore, we cannot attribute beliefs to non-
human animals.  
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The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to all content. 
based mental states. 
Stich's argument is based on his analysis of tlle 
conceptofbelief, and tile corresponding notion of belief 
content. According to Stich, the relation of content-
identity is, in fact, a similarity relation. The notion of 
the content of a belief can be factored into three 
elements: causal-pattern similarity, ideological 
similarity, and reference similarity. 
A pair of belief states count as similar along the 
dimension of causal-pattern similarity if they have 
similar patterns of potential causal interaction with 
(actual or possible) stimuli.6 In addition to global causal-
pattern similarity, there are various dimensions along 
which a pair of belief states can be panially causal-
pattern similar. For example, a pair of belief states may 
interact similarly with other beliefs in inference but may 
have different links with stimuli. These beliefs would 
count as similar when the context focuses interest on 
inferential connections, but as rather dissimilar when 
the context focuses interest on the connections between 
belief and perception. Causal-pattern similarity is the 
feature which is focused upon by classical functionalist 
or conceptual role accounts of content. 
The second sort of feature used to assess similarity 
ofbeliefs is what Stich calls ideological similarity.? The 
ideological similarity of a pair of beliefs is a function 
of the extent to which the beliefs are embedded in 
similar networks of belief. Ideological similarity 
measures the 'doxa~tic neighbourhood' in which a given 
pair of belief states find themselves. As in the case of 
causal-pattern similarity, partial ideological similarity 
is often more important than global ideological 
similarity. Since belief states are compound entities, 
ideological similarity can be assessed separately for 
the several concepts that compose a belief. And context 
can determine which concepts are salient in the 
situation at hand. For example, suppose the context 
focuses on 'bourgeois.' Then, if Boris and Marie both 
say, 'Abstract art is bourgeois,' we may count them as 
having similar beliefs if their other beliefs invoking 
tile bourgeois concept are similar, even though they 
have notably different beliefs invoking their abstract-
art concept. But if the difference in their conceptions 
of abstract art looms large in the context, our judgment 
will be reversed, and they will not count as having 
similar beliefs. 
The third sort of feature used in assessing belief 
state similarity is reference similarity.s According to 
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Stich, a pair of beliefs count as reference similar if 
the terms the subjects use to express the beliefs are 
identical in reference. What actually fixes reference is 
not an easy matter to decide. One prime candidate is 
the causal history of the term, a causal chain stretching 
back through the user's concept, through the concept 
of the person from whom he acquired the term, and so 
on back to the person or stuff denoted. A second 
candidate, defended by Burge, is the use of the term in 
the speaker's linguistic community.9 Neither of these 
accounts is free from difficulties. Stich does not wish 
to adjudicate between tllese accounts. He does say, 
however, that in his view context is an important 
determinant of reference. 1a 
According to Stich, therefore, the notion of sameness 
of content, hence, the notion of sameness of belief, is a 
complex concept which straddles all three features of 
causal-pattern, ideological, and reference similarity. 
Depending on the context of discussion, one or more 
of these factors can assume primary importance. 
I think Stich has, in fact, done a rather good job in 
analyzing the notion ofcontent identity, and his account 
may be correct, or close to correct. My disagreement 
with Stich, however, centres around his treatment of 
reference similarity. His claim that a pair ofbeliefs count 
as reference similar if the terms the subjects use to 
express tlle beliefs are identical is without justitication, 
and automatically prejudices the issue against non-
language users, and against language users who do not 
employ 'terms' as Stich seems to think of them. I shall 
argue that the relation of reference does not only, or 
even primarily, attach to the terms of a language. 
Reference is a natural (specifically, a biological) 
phenomenon based on the need of an organism to adapt 
to its environment. As such, internal states which have 
evolved in order to adapt an organism to its environ-
mental niche have a referential function. Moreover, 
behaviour which has evolved in order to adapt an 
organism to its environmental niche can have a 
referential function. The notion of reference primarily 
attaches to internal states and to behaviour. Derivatively 
it can be applied to the terms of a language. Indeed, its 
application here depends on tlle fact that the use of 
language is a fonn of behaviour different only in degree 
from more primitive modes of behaviour. 
I shall proceed as follows. Firstly, I shall try to show 
why the relation of reference is such a crucial 
component of content. Secondly, I shall argue tllat it 
is Stich's claim tllat reference similarity cannot be 
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applied to nonhuman animals which creates the feeling 
tllat ascription of content to nonhuman animals is 
problematic. This can easily be seen from the fact that 
if we prescind from applying the relation of reference 
similarity to human animals, exactly the same problems 
in ascribing content arise, and this applies whether the 
human animals in question are so called marginal cases, 
or wbether they are normal members ofour own cultural 
group. Thirdly, I want to sketch an account of the 
relation of reference which will provide a sound 
underpinning for the practice of ascribing content 
based states to both human and nonhuman animals. I 
shall argue that such an underpinning is to be found-
in the notion of teleology and the related notion of 
biological junction. 
The Concept of Content 
The inadequacy of any theory of meaning or content 
which is based purely around the notions of ideological 
similarity or causal pattern similarity can be demon-
strated by way of the sort of Twin Earth example made 
famous by Hilary Putnam and by Tyler Burge.n Here 
is Putnam's version of the Twin Earth case. 
We are to conceive of a near duplicate of our planet 
Earth: call it 'Twin Eartll.' Except for certain features 
about to be noted, Twin Earth duplicates Earth in every 
detail. The physical environments look, and largely 
are, identical. Moreover, many inhabitants of Earth 
have duplicate counterparts on Twin Eartb. These 
counterparts are type-identical with their~orre­
sponding Earthlings in point of neurophysiological 
constitution. They also share with their Earth 
counterparts identical experiential and dispositional 
histories, where these are specified non-intentionally. 
The key difference between the two planets Can be 
explained thus: the liquid on Twin Earth that runs in 
rivers and taps is qualitatively identical with the liquid 
that we, on Earth, refer to with tlle term 'water' ; it is 
indistinguishable from water by any casual test. 
Indeed, the Twin Earthlings refer to their liquid using 
the term 'water.' However, the substance they refer to 
using tllat tenn is not water. It is not the substance 
whose chemical structure consists of two parts of 
hydrogen to one part of oxygen. Rather, the liquid on 
Twin Earth has a radically different chemical 
structure-XYZ. Therefore, water on Earth is not the 
same substance as what is denoted by the term 'water' 
on Twin Earth. Despite being qualitatively identical, 
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water, and what goes by tlle same name on Twin 
Earth-call it the substance retaw-are distinct 
substances. 
Suppose Herbert] is an English speaker of Emth, 
and Herberlc is his Twin Em·th counterpart. Neitller 
knows the physical structure of tlle subslaIlce which he 
calls ·water.' We can make the following assumptions 
about the two Herberts. Firstly, we can suppose that 
they are identical in point of physical constitution. 
Secondly, we can suppose that they have the same inner 
functional states, the same behavioural dispositions, and 
that tlley exhibit the smne bodily movements; where 
all of these are non-intentionally specified. Given a non-
intentional specification, functional states, behavioural 
dispositions, and bodily movements supervene on 
physical constitution. Thus, the second assumption is a 
consequence of the first. Identity of functional states, 
behaviouml dispositions. and bodily movements entails 
that the two Herberts are identical in point of what Stich 
calls causal pattern. 
Since neitller of the Herberts is aware of tlle physical 
structure of tlle substance he calls' water.' the following 
state of affairs is a definite possibility. There is a set S 
of statements composed of Sl: 'water is wet'; S2: 'water 
is colourless'; S3 'water is drinkable,' ... Sn, such that 
bOtll Herbert) and Herberlc instantiate S. That is, both 
Herbert) and Herbe~ believe all and only statements 
S 1, S2, ... , Sn about what tlley call 'water.' That is, 
Herbert) and Herberlc are ideologically identical, or 
ideologically exactly similar. 
Thus. the assumption that Herbert] and Herbert2 
share the same causal pattern and the assumption that 
they share the same ideological network can be built 
into Putnam's thought experiment. But, even if this is 
true, it does not follow tllat the two Herberts share tlle 
same beliefs about water. In fact, Herbert., cannot have 
any belief about water. As Putnam points out, the form 
of words, 'water is wet' means something different in 
the moutll of Herbert) ilian it does in the mouth of 
Herberlc. The former's utterances of 'water' refer to 
water. The latter's utterances of the same phonetic 
form refer to retaw. Hence, ilie utterances differ in 
meaning because tlley differ in reference. Furtllermore, 
the differences in meaning affect oblique occurrences 
in 'that' -clauses which specify. the contents of mental 
states. Herbert) believes that water is wet. But Herber~ 
cannot have this belief since he has never been in 
contact with water. Herbert2 can only believe that 
retaw is wet. 
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1llerefore, even though Herbert] and Herbert2 are 
identical in point of causal pattern and ideological 
doxastic network, nonetheless, tlleir utterances still 
differ in meaning, and their beliefs still differ in 
content. The inevitable conclusion is that to try to base 
an account of meaning and content purely around ilie 
notions of causal pattern similarity and ideological 
similarity will result in a seriously inadequate account 
of meaning and content. Instead, we must recognize 
tllat reference is an essential constituent of meaning 
and content. 
This claim is no longer controversial. But laboring 
this point does serve to bring out clearly the fact that 
Stich's claim tllat reference similarity is not applicable 
to nonhuman animals is a very serious claim indeed. 
For if tlle concept of reference similarity could not be 
correctly applied to nonhuman animals, then tllere 
would not be any valid notion of content which could 
be ascribed to such animals. So, the claim that reference 
similarity cannot be applied to nonhuman animals is 
really tlle pivotal claim around which tlle whole of 
Stich's argument turns. But Stich offers neither 
justification nor defense of this claim Rather, it has the 
status of an assumption. Eventually I shall argue that 
this assumption is false. Firstly, however, I want to show 
how it is this assumption which leads us to think that 
tlle ascription of content based states to nonhuman 
animals is problematic. My strategy will be as follows: 
I shall try to show that exactly the same considerations 
which undermine our confidence in tlle ascription of 
content to nonhumllil animals eml also he applied to 
human animals, if we assume, as Stich does in the case 
of nonhuman animals, that the concept of reference 
similarity is inapplicable. This will be sufficient to show 
that it is Stich's denial of the applicability of reference 
similarity to nonhuman animals which undermines our 
ability to ascribe content to them. In particular, iliere is 
nothing intrinsically problematic with such ascription. 
Ideological Dissimilarity 
and the Case Against Animals 
Aliliough human and nonhuman animals do exhibit 
causal-pattern differences, attribution of content based 
mental states to nonhuman animals becomes especially 
problematic when we focus on the ideological 
differences between the two. I shall confme my attention 
to such ideological differences. Does Fi~o believe iliere 
is a bone buried in ilie yard? If we focus on tlle 
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ideological differences that obtain between Fido and 
hwnans, it is difficult to see how he can. The ideological 
differences undermine the view that Fido possesses the 
concept of a bone. For example, does Fido know that 
bones form part of the skeleton of certain sorts of 
creature? Does he know the general anatomical 
functions of bones? Does he know the composition of 
bones? Is it possible to explain the difference between 
real and fake bones to Fido? Such questions could be 
multiplied indefinitely. They all point to the conclusion 
that the doxastic network in which Fido's concept of a 
bone is situated is vastly different from our own. Thus, 
it does not seem possible to attribute content based states 
of the form ... believes that X is a bone' to Fido, because 
Fido does not have the same concept of a bone as we 
do. Attribution of such a content based state is predicated 
upon our concept ofa bone, and this is a concept which 
is not shared by Fido. 
Thus, if we focus on the component of ideological 
similarity, the attribution of content based states to 
nonhuman animals becomes problematic. Every 
indication suggests that nonhwnan animals do not share 
an appropriately similar doxastic ideological network 
of beliefs. Therefore, they cannot share our concepts. 
Therefore, they cannot share our contents. Therefore, 
they cannot share our beliefs (desires etc.). 
Marginal Cases and Not So Marginal Cases 
Some authors have pointed out that if Stich's argument 
can he applied to nonhuman animals, then it can also 
be applied to at least some human animals. 12 Mentally 
handicapped humans, for example, will probably 
possess an ideological framework radically different 
from our own. The same can be said of young children. 
Similarly, normal individuals in cultures which are 
radically different from our own will also probably 
exhibit important ideological differences. So, if 
ideological dissimilarities undermine attribution of 
content based states to nonhuman animals, they will 
probably also undermine attribution of content based 
states to some human animals. 
This claim does not bother Stich. In fact he endorses 
it. 13 He sees it as an inherent shortcoming in the practice 
of attributing content based states. This is the basis of 
Stich's syntactic theory of tile mind: the view that the 
explanations of cognitive psychology should not invoke . 
the semantic content possessed by mental states, but, 
instead, focus only on their syntactic properties. 
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Attribution of content is to play no role in a mature 
cognitive science. According to Stich, it is only by 
prescinding from attributions of content, that cognitive 
psychology can hope to develop explanations which 
apply to children, to the mentally handicapped, and to 
members of radically different cultures. 
However, I feel the same sort of argument can be 
pushed further to an extent that Stich might not wish to 
endorse. Consider again the concept ofa bone. It seems 
to be Stich's view that every description which a normal 
person of our society associates with the term 'bone' 
enters into the determination of the concept of a bone. 
But this cannot be right. It would render communication 
impossible. For it seems overwhelmingly likely that 
each distinct person will associate a slightly different 
set of information with the term. If this is so, and if 
every piece of information is relevant to the 
determination of the concept of a bone, then each 
distinct person will have a distinct concept of a bone. 
The idea that there is the concept of a bone, shared even 
by normal members of a single society, will have to be 
rejected. Similar remarks will apply, mutatis mutandis, 
to all, or almost all, terms of a given language. And the 
problem with this is that it makes any sort of 
communication impossible. It is not communication, 
but equivocation, which would be the rule, even 
between normal members of a single ideological group. 
In this way, the possibility ofattribution of content based 
states to human animals, even to those human animals 
which form normal members of one's own society, 
would be undermined. 
Two possible solutions to this problem suggest 
themselves, neither of which is very appealing. On the 
one hand, one might try to develop Stich's idea that the 
concept of content-identity is a similarity concept. This 
would provide us with a graded notion of content 
identity according to which you and I both nwre or less 
believe that there is a bone buried in the yard. There 
are three problems with this idea. First, it is not at all 
obvious that this move would solve the problem of 
communication. Secondly, the idea is, in any case, very 
dubious. The idea depends for whatever plausibility it 
has on confusing two quite different senses of 'more or 
less believing that P.' 14 On the one hand there is the 
relatively innocuous idea that agents can differ in their 
epistemic commitment to P (I will nail my flag to P, you 
grant P only your provisional assent). This idea is not 
at issue. On the other hand, there is the idea that 
propositional identity is a matter of degree. There i~ a 
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big difference between the claim that one can more or 
less believe that P, and the claim that what one believes 
is more or less P. And it is the second claim that is at 
issue here. The idea that there might be something which 
is almost, but not quite, the proposition that a bone is 
buried in the yard seems to make little sense. Third, 
even if sense could be made of the graded notion of 
propositional identity, it would then be uncertain on 
what grounds Stich could then deny ascription of 
content to nonhuman animals. For it is certainly true 
that Fido does have somebeliefs about bones. As Regan 
has argued, Fido can plausibly be viewed as having a 
preference-beliefabout bones.15 Fido, from time to time, 
desires a flavour that he finds in bones. And on the basis 
of his non-verbal behaviour-the fact that Fido would 
choose a bone over, say, a tree branch-we are justified 
in ascribing to Fido the belief that bones are related to 
his desires or preferences in the following way: bones 
satisfy certain desires he has and are to be chosen to 
satisfy those desires. If we accept, as I think we must, 
that Fido does have this crude sort ofpreference-belief, 
and if we accept the graded notion of propositional or 
content identity advocated by Stich, then we have 
grounds for saying that Fido can believe more or less 
that a bone is buried in the yard.16 Of course, what Fido 
believes is not the same as what I believe, but the same 
also applies to what is believed by other normal 
members of my own cultural group. 
The second possible solution to the problem facing 
Stich involves denying that every piece of information 
associated by speakers with bones enters into 
determination of the concept of a bone. We might 
distinguish between what we can call the cognitive 
concept, and what we can call the seTlwntic concept of 
a bone. Consider the term 'bone.' The cognitive concept 
associated with this term is essentially relative to 
individuals, and consists of the set ofall the information 
which that particular individual associates with the term. 
Thus, the cognitive concept is not uniform, even 
between normal individuals of the same ideological 
group. There is no such thing asJhe cognitive concept 
of a bone. The semantic concept, on the other hand, is 
not relative to the individual. It consists of certain core 
iriformation which any competent user of a language L 
will associate with the term 'bone.'17 If Stich's case 
from ideological dissimilarity is based on the notion of 
cognitive concept, then it will not only undermine 
attribution of content based states to nonhuman animals, 
but also to human aninlals, even human animals which 
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are normal members of the same ideological group. If 
Stich's case is based on the notion of semantic concept, 
then it is more promising. For, in this case, it seems 
that Stich's argument does provide us with reason for 
thinking that attribution of content based states to 
nonhuman animals (and to children, the mentally 
handicapped, and members of other cultures) is 
problematic. It is implausible to suppose that dogs, for 
instance, associate the same core set of descriptions with 
bones as semantically competent humans do. 
There are two problems with introducing the notion 
of a semantic concept at this juncture. The first is that 
there is no evidence whatever to suggest that there is any 
such thing as a semantic concept. That is, there is no 
evidence whatever to suggest that all competent speakers 
associate the same core information with a given term, 
indeed, most available evidence points the other way. 
The notion of a semantic concept is a transcendental 
posit one which is introduced as a condition of any 
meaningful communication. Transcendental posits are 
all very well, but their credibility is diminished to the 
extent that another explanation of the phenomenon they 
seek to ground is available. I shall argue, later, that there 
is another explanation of the possibility of meaningful 
communication. This explanation centres around the 
notion of reference, and does not invoke the notion of 
shared core information 
Secondly, even if we allow Stich the notion of a 
semantic concept, the grounds for denying ascription 
of content to nonhuman animals again collapse. For 
even if nonhuman animals associate different core 
information with bones than do human animals, it 
still follows that they do associate some core 
information with bones (an example would be the 
preference belief cited by Regan). And this means 
that there is a semantic concept possessed by dogs, a 
(presumably distinct) semantic concept possessed by 
cats, etc. That is, this sort of approach leads naturally 
to the introduction of a species-specific notion of a 
semantic concept: The semantic concept of object X 
possessed by species S is the core information which 
normal members of S associate with X. And this 
leaves us with the interesting empirical task of 
finding out exactly what information normal 
members of S do associate with X. In short, the 
argument only shows that the content we can attribute 
to nonhuman animals will be different from the 
content we can attribute to human animals. And all 
this means is that we have a genuine empirical task 
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of finding out what content actually can be attributed 
to nonhuman animals. 
What I have tried to show in this section is that if 
Stich's argument can be used to undenuine ascription 
of content to nonhuman animals, then it can also be 
used to undenuine the ascription of content to all 
human animals, even those human animals who 
constitute nonnal members of our own cultural group. 
This claim, if correct, shows that the alleged 
problematic status of our ascriptions of content to 
nonhuman animals does not derive from the nature of 
the nonhuman animals themselves, but rather from the 
assumptions which underlie Stich's theory of meaning 
as it applies to nonhuman animals. Stich assumes that 
the relation of reference similarity is not applicable to 
nonhuman animals. The alleged problems with 
ascription of content to nonhuman animals stem 
directly from this assumption. In the remainder of this 
paper, I want to (ocus on the concept of reference, 
and show how a certain plausible theory of the 
reference relation provides a useful theoretical 
justification for our practice of ascribing content to 
nonhuman animals. 
Summer & Fall 1994 
How Nonhuman Animals Can Refer 
Stich thinks that the notion of content-identity is a 
similarity relation which can be factored into three 
components: causal-pattern similarity, ideological 
similarity, and reference similarity. But Stich thinks that 
the relation of reference similarity is inapplicable to 
nonhuman animals: "Since they have no language, 
reference similarity is out of the question." This follows 
from his characterization of reference similarity as a 
relation holding between the tenus of a language and 
the world. However, Stich gives no justification or 
defense of this characterization. Stich does allow that 
some sort of derivative reference relation might obtain 
between animal concepts and the world. But he does 
not regard this as important enough to warrant the 
inclusion of reference similarity as a detenuinant of the 
content of animal belief states. In my view, this is to 
get the order of primacy reversed. Reference is a relation 
which holds primarily between internal states of 
creatures and the world, or between the behaviour of 
creatures and the world, and.derivatively between tenus 
or expressions and the world. The remainder of this 
paper will be concerned with defending this claim. 
One of the principal projects of recent philosophy 
of mind has been providing an account of the relation 
of reference. This has been particularly important 
insofar as the notion of reference ha~ been seen as the 
basis of the relation of intentionality. The intentionality 
of mental states, it is thought, derives from the 
referential relations holding between internal states and 
the world. 'TIle theory of reference I shall now present 
does have its opponents, but, in my opinion, is the best 
philosophical account currently available. 
The theory I shall discuss is typically known as the 
teleological theoryJ8 Any teleological theory of 
representation or reference will employ, as a pivotal 
concept, what we can call relational proper function. 19 
The proper function of some organ or trait or process is 
what it is designed to do, what it is supposed to do, 
what it ought to do. Proper functions can come about 
either through the intentions of a designer, or through a 
mindless process like natural selection. A hammer has 
the proper function of knocking in nails in virtue of the 
intentions of its makers and users; a heart has the proper 
function of pumping blood in virtue of the selective 
pressures that have shaped the physiology of organisms. 
The notion of proper function is defined in tenus of 
what an item should do, not what it actually does or is 
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disposed to do. Thus, proper function cannot be defined 
causally or dispositionally: what something does, or is 
disposed to do, is not always what it is supposed to do. 
(The function of a sperm cell, for example, is to fertilize 
the female ovum. But the vast majority of sperm cells 
do not accomplish this task). 
In the case of evolved organisms, function is always 
ultimately relative to survival (or gene reproduction): 
the function of an evolved characteristic is always 
ultimately to enhance reproductive capacity. Generally 
this means that it is to enable the organism to cope 
with its given environment: to locate food, evade 
predators, protect itself against heat or cold, and so on. 
An organism must be designed (by natural selection) 
according to the environmental constraints. And here 
is where the relationality of proper function arises. 
Proper functions are generally defined relatively to 
some environmental object or feature. Thus, the 
function of the chameleon's pigmentation mechanism 
is to make the chameleon the same colour as its 
immediate environment; the function of the lion's 
curved claws is to catch and hold onto large prey; the 
function of the bee's dance is to help other bees locate 
nectar, and so on. In each case we specify the function 
of the characteristic in terms of a relation to some 
environmental item. And the reason for this relational 
specification is that the very reason why the charac-
teristics in question exist is that they have evolved to 
meet certain environmental pressures. 
The core idea of the teleological theory of 
representation is that the mind and its contents are 
evolutionary products also. Thus, mental states will have 
their own distinctive relational proper functions. 
Therefore, on quite general evolutionary grounds, it is 
to be expected that such states as desires, beliefs, and 
perceptions will have environment directed functions. 
And identifying a given mental state via its semantic 
content is simply a way of identifying that state by way 
of its relational proper function. That is, the content of 
a mental states is (at least in part) determined by the 
relational proper function of that state. Content is a 
consequence of relational proper function. Thus, on this 
view, the externality of content, exhibited by the thought 
experiments ofPutnam and Burge, is simply a reflection 
of the relationality of mental states; of the fact that any 
given mental state has evolved in order to fulfill a certain 
relational proper function. 
Consider the desire for water, caused (we may 
safely suppose) by the organism's need for water. The 
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relational proper function of this state is to bring about 
the introduction of water into the interior of the 
organism-to make it drink water. The desire exists 
in order to have certain environment directed effects 
(although, of course, it may not always have those 
effects). But, in specifying the environmental relatum 
of the relational proper function of the desire, we 
specify the object to which the de.llire refers, the 
environmental feature which the desire represents. In 
this way, the teleological theory understands the 
concept of reference in terms of the concept of 
relational proper function. Reference, is constituted 
by relational proper function. 
Similar stories apply to cognitive mental states such 
as belief and perception. The relational proper function 
of the wolf's perception of the caribou is to indicate to 
the wolf the presence of the caribou. The reference and 
the content of the wolf's perception is a function of 
that perception's relational proper function. In this way, 
the wolf's need for food can be satisfied by acting 
appropriately. A basic biological duality operates here. 
On the one hand there is a need of the organism in 
respect of the world, on the other hand a sensor that 
indicates to the organism when the environment is the 
way it is needed to be. Desire and perception are 
mechanisms, installed by evolution, which perform 
Ulese interlocking functions of sensitivity to need and 
sensitivity to what in the world will meet the need. 
Belief, on this view, is a mechanism superimposed on 
desire and perception, which functions so as to guide 
behaviour in the light of perception in order to satisfy 
desires. The teleological theory sees in these basic 
relational functions the deep roots of content. 
The teleological theory does not purport to be a 
complete theory of content. If it did, it would attract 
the following obvious objection: traits and structures 
of organisms can have relational proper functions and 
yet not have propositional content. It does not seem 
appropriate, for example, to assign semantic content to 
hearts, despite their relational proper function. Rather, 
the teleological theory is advanced as a theory of 
reference. The teleological theory only purports to bea 
theory of a part of content: that part of content which is 
constituted by the relation of reference. 
This being so, the teleological theory is best viewed 
wiiliin the framework of what has become known as 
the dual component theory of mental properties.20 This 
theory regards our intuitive conception of content as 
made up of two separable components. One component 
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consists in an encoding or representation of things in 
the world. The other is made up of properly semantic 
relations such as reference which hold between such 
representations and the things represented. The former 
component, often called the internal component, is 
constitutive of the causal-explanatory role of belief, 
while the latter, often known as the external component, 
is bound up with our taking beliefs as things which refer 
to the world. We view beliefs both as states of the 
head explanatory of behaviour, and as items which 
enter into referential relations with the world. Content 
supervenes on both components taken together. Stich's 
account of content identity is tacitly a dual component 
theory. His notions of causal pattern similarity and 
ideological similarity belong to the internal component 
as characterized above, since they describe or advert to 
relations holding between beliefs, desires and other 
mental states. Reference similarity, on the other hand, 
is Stich's version of the external component, since it is 
based on relations which hold between mental states 
and the world. Both internal and external components 
are, according to the dual component theory, necessary 
for content. 
The dual component theory faces the question of 
which component is more important in detellIlining the 
content of a given mental state. The most attractive 
version of the theory, I believe, makes this a contextual 
matter; it varies from situation to situation depending 
largely on the interests we have in making the attribution 
of content. An important consequence of this is that it 
is possible to attribute a content based state to an 
organism purely upon the basis of knowledge of the 
external component, of the way the organism is 
referentially related to the world. In order to do this, 
one need not know anything about the internal 
component. That is, one need not know anything 
specific about the causal and ideological. network 
within which the attributed content is embedded. At 
most one need only know that there is such a network. 
On the other hand, it is also possible, depending on one's 
underlying interest, to attribute a content based state to 
an organism purely on the basis of knowledge of the 
various causal and ideological networks in which that 
content based state is embedded. One need not know 
anything specific about the referential relations that the 
state bears to the world. At most, one need only know 
that there are such relations. 
These considerations provide us with a useful 
framework for assessing the question of whether 
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ascriptions ofcontent based states to nonhuman animals 
are possible. In order to justify such ascriptions all we 
would need to show is: 
1. The nonhuman animal to which the content based 
state is ascribed instantiates causal-pattern and 
ideological networks in which the ascribed content 
based state is embedded. 
2. The ascribed content based state possesses a 
(known) relational proper function which relates 
it to some object, property, or relation in the 
environment of the nonhuman animal to which 
the content based state is ascribed. 
(1) does not commit us to having any deep 
familiarity with either the causal or ideological 
networks. It claims only that the networks exist. (2) 
claims not merely that the content based state has a 
relational proper function, but also that one knows what 
it is. (1) and (2) provide a sufficient, but not a necessary, 
condition for attribution of the content based state in 
question. It seems pretty clear that condition (1) holds 
for both human and nonhuman animals. And given this 
is so, we can legitimately ascribe content based states 
to nonhuman animals purely on the basis of what we 
know about the referential relations which those states 
bear to the world. 
In other words, it is possible, indeed justifiable, to 
ascribe a content based state purely on the basis of 
knowledge of the relational proper function of that state, 
provided one has good reason for thinking that the state 
is embedded in appropriate causal and ideological 
networks. That is, where causal pattern and/or 
ideological frameworks are unknown or uncertain, 
reference can carry the assignment of content. Thus, 
the claim that any content based states instantiated by 
nonhuman animals will probably be embedded in causal 
and ideological networks which radically differ from 
those possessed by human animals is irrelevant; it in 
no way undermines attribution of content based states 
to nonhuman animals. 
To summarize, the positive framework I am 
advancing is based on the following claims: Firstly, 
reference is a partial determinant of the content of a 
belief, desire, perception etc. Secondly, the concept of 
reference can be spelled out in tenus of the concept of 
relational proper function. Third, beliefs, desires, 
perceptions, and other content based states are hybrid 
entities, made up of two components, internal and 
95 Between the Species 
The Mental L!fe ofSome Animals 
external. The internal component is reflected in Stich's 
notions of causal pattern and ideological similarity. The 
external component is reflected in Stich's notion of 
reference similarity. Fourth, which component plays the 
primary role in the detennination of content is a 
contextual matter. It varies from situation to situation 
depending on the interests we have in ascribing content. 
So, relative to interest I, it is possible to ascribe content 
C purely on the basis of the internal component, 
providing one has reason to believe that an external 
component exists. And relative to interest 12, it is 
possible to ascribe content C purely on the basis of the 
external component, providing one has reason to believe 
that an internal component exists. And, fifth, it is thus 
possible to ascribe a content based state to a nonhuman 
animal (or a human animal, for that matter) based purely 
on knowledge of the external component of that content. 
This amounts to the claim that it is possible to ascribe 
the state purely on the basis of the relational proper 
function of the state, providing one has reason to believe 
that the state is appropriately embedded ill causal and 
ideological networks, 
Therefore, the practice of ascribing content on the 
basis of relational proper function is legitimate. And 
this is what provides the framework and the justification 
for our practice of ascribing content to nonhuman 
animals. On this view, we are justified in attributing 
content to nonhuman animals because we have an 
underlying interest in describing the relations which 
obtain between organism and environment. These 
relations are incorporated into the notion of relational 
proper function and, hence, into the notion of reference. 
Thus, content can be ascribed purely on the basis of 
relational proper function. Viewed in this light, 
ascription of content based states to nonhuman 
animals is not crude anthropomorphism; neither is it 
sentimentalism; it is simply good old fashioned 
evolutionary biology. 
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